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Chadwick: Regulating Genetically Engineered Microorganisms Under the Toxic

NOTE
REGULATING GENETICALLY ENGINEERED
MICROORGANISMS UNDER THE TOXIC
SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT
[HIow are they to be answered ifthat which requires to be answered
is not spoken?'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Genetic engineering changes the very blueprint of life.2 While the
genetic engineer often can predict how such engineering will affect the
organism's structure, the organism's ability to survive, reproduce, and
interact with the environment cannot be predicted merely from knowledge of structure.3 However, under newly proposed rules for regulating

1. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 37 (David Spitz ed. 1975).
2. See JAMES D. WATSON ET AL., RECOMBINANT DNA: A SHORT COURSE 1 (1983) (stating
that no substance is as important as deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA")). Genetic engineering places

foreign DNA into an organism, usually by enzymatically cutting out a desired DNA segment and
then, through the use of a second enzyme, joining that segment into some of the organism's DNA.
For convenience, foreign DNA is often joined to a small circular piece of bacterial DNA called a
plasmid. The plasmid contains the necessary signals to exist and replicate within a bacterial cell. A
plasmid with newly inserted foreign DNA constitutes a "genetically engineered" or "recombinant"
DNA. To get the recombinant plasmid into bacteria, the plasmid is simply incubated at about zero
degrees Celcius with bacterial cells in the presence of calcium, and then this mixture is quickly
heated to 37-42 'C for about two minutes. The mixture is then returned to normal culture conditions
so the cells can recover and grow. See id.
at 58-90; JUNE GOODFIELD, PLAYING GOD 12-21 (1977);
DAVID FREIFELDER, ESSENTIALS OF MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 215-22 (1985); BERNARD PERBAL, A
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MOLECULAR CLONING 411-16 (2d ed. 1988).
3. See COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION OF THE INTRODUCTION OF GENETICALLY
MODIFIED MICROORGANISMS AND PLANTS INTO THE ENVIRONMENT, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
FIELD TESTING GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS: FRAMEWORK FOR DECISIONS 93 (1989)
[hereinafter COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION] (stating that even though molecular techniques
allow precise genetic manipulation, such manipulation may still produce unintended genetic changes
owing to the pleiotropic nature of gene action); see also infra part IV.B. A change in gene structure
often changes the structure or expression of a protein. See JAMES D. WATSON ET AL., MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 78-79 (4th ed. 1987). Such a structural change can have profound effects
upon an organism. For example, sickle cell anemia is caused by a single amino acid change in
hemoglobin. See id. at 79. Yet this one small change gives rise to all the diverse problems associated
with sickle cell anemia.
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genetically engineered microorganisms, 4 the Environmental Protection

Agency ("EPA") may only gather information about the microorganism's
genetic structure--that is, what the microorganism is, not what it does.
This may happen for several reasons. First, the genetic engineer who
created the microorganism rarely has any direct knowledge about the
microorganism's environmental risks, even though that engineer probably
knows what strain was engineered, and may have a detailed understanding of the microorganism's genetic structure.' Second, while the new
rules list factors that the EPA believes will indicate risk, the new rules
fail to identify what parameters determine risk.6 Third, the new rules
cannot require generation of new data which might illuminate risk

The exception to the rule that a microorganism's risks cannot be derived from its structure
may be the structural change which is known to alter the microorganism so that it cannot survive
outside the laboratory. See, e.g., WATSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 72-73. Such "safe" microorganisms have been purposefully engineered so that they are defective in some manner, for example, so
that they metabolically require some essential nutrient or have a very fragile cell wall. See id. Hence,
the absence of such an essential structural element, which normally permits survival outside the
laboratory, is strong evidence that the microorganism does not constitute a health or environmental
risk.
Note also that a microorganism's health risks might also be more predictable than its
environmental risks. Health risks are caused by pathogenic microorganisms, which are defined as
having the ability to cause disease. COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION, supra, at 107.
Virulence is the relative ability of an individual strain to cause disease under defined conditions, for
example, in different types of organisms. See id. An organism's health risks may be more predictable
than its environmental risks because a very large proportion of a pathogen's genetic material is
devoted to generating it's pathogenicity. See id. at 111-12. Therefore, minor genetic changes may
not destroy this pathogenicity. In fact, when the recipient of genetic material is a pathogen, that
genetically engineered pathogen may acquire increased virulence, and thus be able to infect new
types of organisms. See id.at 110-11. Hence, the EPA should presume that a pathogen remains a
health risk when it is genetically engineered.
4. Microbial Products of Biotechnology; Proposed Regulation Under the Toxic Substances
Control Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 45,526 (1994) [hereinafter Proposed Rules] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 725) (proposed September 1, 1994). These proposed rules were promulgated under section 5 of
the Toxic Substances Control Act. Id. at 45,526-27. The EPA is scheduled to take final action on
the proposed rules in June, 1996. Regulatory Agenda, 60 Fed. Reg. 23,928, 23,957 (1995).
5. See John C. Fry & Martin J.Day, Preface to BACTERIAL GENETICS IN NATURAL
ENVIRONMENTS at vii (John C. Fry & Martin J.Day eds., 1990) (stating that few researchers have
crossed the divide between bacterial genetics and bacterial ecology); COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC
EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 87 (stating that "only relatively few field trials have been conducted
with microorganisms modified by molecular methods"); id.at 101 ("We know very little about the
exchange of genetic information among closely or distantly related microorganisms under natural
conditions.'); John E. Beringer & Mark J.Bale, The Survival and Persistence of GeneticallyEngineeredMicro-Organisms,in THE RELEASE OF GENETICALLY-ENGINEERED MICRO-ORGANISMS
29, 34 (M. Sussman et al. eds., 1988) ("We know so little about the biochemical determinants of
competitiveness [in Rhizobium] that we are unable to utilize modem genetic techniques to produce
more competitive inoculants.").
6. See infra part IV.C.
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because these rules will be promulgated under the Toxic Substances
Control Act ("TSCA"),7 which requires the EPA first to make a finding
that the microorganism "may present" an unreasonable risk before testing
can be ordered Thus, the EPA may only be able to gather whatever
information is available--microorganism source and genetic structure-which only indirectly and imperfectly illuminates the

microorganism's environmental risks.
Moreover, to withstand judicial scrutiny, any EPA finding of
unreasonable risk must be supported by substantial evidence on the
record.9 However, little or no evidence now exists that a genetically
engineered microorganism is a health or environmental risk.'0 Thus, the
EPA cannot rely on the existing record of safety to make a finding of
unreasonable risk. Instead, the EPA must use the newly proposed rules

7. Proposed Rules, supranote 4, at 45,526-27.
8. Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, § 4(a), 90 Stat. 2003, 2006 (1976)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (1988)). Before testing can be ordered, TSCA requires
an EPA finding that the microorganism "may present" an unreasonable risk or that "substantial
quantities" of the microorganism will be released into the environment. See id.; Dichloromethane,
Nitrobenzene and 1, 1, 1-Trichloroethane; Proposed Test Rule, 46 Fed. Reg. 30,300, 30,300-04
(1981) [hereinafter Dichloromethane Test Rule] (providing a description of the findings that the EPA
must make before it can require testing under TSCA section 4, 15 U.S.C. § 2603). However, the
EPA does not define or address what "substantial quantities" of a living microorganism might be and
the proposed rules specifically prohibit release of "small quantities" of microorganisms while continuing to allow environmental release of small quantities of chemicals. See infra notes 152-54 and
accompanying text. Such proposals suggest that the key determinant for regulation becomes
unreasonable risk rather than what quantity of a microorganism may be released.
9. Toxic Substances Control Act § 19(c)(1)(B)(i), 90 Stat. at 2040 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 2618(c)(1)(B)(i)) (1988 & Supp. 1993)); see infra part III.B.
10. STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC ENGINEERING 3 (Comm. Print 1984)
[hereinafter HOUSE SUBcOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS] ("As the safety of recombinant DNA research
itself has been demonstrated, emphasis on the commercial aspects of biotechnology has increased.");
COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION, supranote 3, at 4 (stating that while our experience with
environmental introductions of genetically modified microorganisms is limited, no adverse effects
have developed from such introductions); John C. Fry & Martin J. Day, PlasmidTransfer and the
Release of Genetically Engineered Bacteria in Nature: A Discussion and Summary, in BACTERIAL
GENETICS IN NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS, supra note 5, at 243, 248-49 (suggesting that "we should
not be too concerned about the release of genetically engineered bacteria into the environment");
Letter from Charles C. Hancock, Executive Officer, American Society for Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, to the Environmental Protection Agency 2 (May 16, 1989) (on file with the HofstraLaw
Review) (stating that "dozens, if not hundreds, of genetically-engineered microbes" have been
released into the environment and that "no one has ever been hurt by any of them"). The EPA has
also stated that it is "not aware of any evidence which demonstrates that organisms mutated through
recombinant DNA techniques are, as a class, inherently riskier than organisms mutated through other
techniques or than conventional chemical products." Foundation on Economic Trends v. Thomas,
661 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D.D.C. 1986).
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to define and identify risk determinants or the relevant information will
not be obtained to effectively evaluate microbial risk.
This Note argues that the newly proposed rules will not generate the
necessary information to create an adequate record upon which to make
a reasoned evaluation of risk. The EPA must find the statutory authority
to determine what parameters establish risk and to require reporting of
information relating to such parameters."1 While some authority exists
under TSCA section 10 for the EPA to identify those parameters,12 it
is still unclear whether, under TSCA, the EPA can require reporting of
information illuminating such risk parameters. 3
Part I describes some of the problems associated with regulating
genetically engineered organisms. Part II describes the regulatory history
of genetically engineered microorganisms. Part I describes how the
decision to regulate genetically engineered microorganisms under TSCA
will control that regulation. Part IV explains some of the problems the
EPA may have in regulating genetically engineered microorganisms
under the newly drafted regulations, particularly in view of the statutory
standards of TSCA. The conclusion suggests that the EPA utilize its
authority under TSCA to determine how to better regulate these
organisms.

11. See EnvironmentalImplications of Genetic Engineering: HearingsBefore the Subcomm.
on Investigations and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Science, Research and Technology of the
House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1983) [hereinafter Hearings]
(testimony of Dr. Frances E. Sharples of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory that the appropriate
thing to do is "to start doing some research that develops some form of valid testing on what the
effects of such introductions might be"); HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 10, at
III (stating that "[p]redicting the specific type, magnitude, or probability of environmental effects
associated with deliberate release will be extremely difficult at the present time" and recognizing the
"need to provide a clear and timely path for appropriate public review and agency decisionmaking
on the products of biotechnology").
12. Toxic Substances Control Act § 10, 90 Stat. at 2031-32 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 2609 (1988)).
13. See infra parts uI.B-C, IV; see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, Note, The Rutabaga That
Ate Pittsburgh:FederalRegulation of Free Release Biotechnology, 72 VA. L. REv. 1529, 1553-61
(1986) (describing some of the deficiencies of TSCA for regulating genetically engineered
microorganisms); Valerie M. Fogleman, RegulatingScience: An Evaluation of the Regulation of
Biotechnology Research, 17 ENVTL. L. 183,259-63 (1987) (describing how the EPA may not be able
to make a finding of unreasonable risk under TSCA).
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II.

THE PROBLEM WITH GENETICALLY ENGINEERED
MICROORGANISMS

A genetic engineer creates new life forms by changing the genetic
material of an organism.14 Such changes can give the organism useful
new traits, for example, the ability to metabolize pollutants into non-toxic
products, 5 to prevent ice from destroying crops,1 6 and to inexpensively
produce large amounts of human insulin and interferon. 7 Often, a
genetic engineer will know exactly what structural changes are being
made, down to the molecular level.'" Yet even this precise knowledge
will not enable the genetic engineer to predict how well the genetically
engineered organism will grow and compete in the environment.' 9
Moreover, while the genetically engineered microorganism will have
many of the same characteristics as the "parental" microorganism from
which it was derived,2" the parent's characteristics are only an indicator
of what the recombinant progeny's characteristics will be.2 A structural
relationship to a known, benign life form does not eliminate risk-any
new life form is so complex that it's potential cannot be ascertained from

14. See supra note 2.
15. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980); David A. Hopwood, The Genetic
Programming of Industrial Microorganisms, SCI. AM., Sept. 1981, at 90, 97 (describing a
multiplasmid bacterium that grows rapidly on a diet of crude oil).
16. See COMMITrEE ON ScIENTIIc EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 87 (describing icenucleation-deficient Pseudomonas mutants).
17. See Arnold L. Demain & Nadine A. Solomon, Industrial Microbiology, Sci. AM., Sept.
1981, at 66, 74 (stating that interferon and insulin can be produced by recombinant-DNA technology
and that, as a result, the cost of interferon may decrease from about $2 million for 50 milligrams to
as little as pennies per milligram).
18. See COMMrrEE ON SCIENTIFC EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 97 ("Molecular methods,
used either to modify or to characterize genotypes, provide a degree of precision unavailable through
classical microbial genetic techniques.').
19. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also infra part IV.B.
20. See Beringer & Bale, supra note 5, at 29 (explaining why a genetically engineered
microorganism ("GEM") differs little from its parent).
21. See Hearings,supra note 11, at 7 (testimony of Dr. Martin Alexander that, contrary to
statements by others, even slight changes arising from genetic engineering may alter the harmfulness
of organisms); EDWARD A. BIRGE, BACTERIAL AND BACrERIOPHAGE GENETICS 378 (3d ed. 1994)
(stating that cloned DNA "might be perfectly harmless in the bacterium in which it was originally
cloned but might confer unwanted antibiotic resistance, pathogenicity, and so forth, on other
bacteria"); HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 10, at 19 (describing two normally
nonpathogenic microorganisms which were combined and, surprisingly, yielded a pathogenic isolate
and another isolate that killed tree seedlings). COMMrTEE ON SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION, supra note
3, at 97 (stating that it is the phenotypic properties of the modified microorganism that is of primary
concem); see also infra part IV.B.
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its anatomy, or from its lineage?'
Moreover, a genetically engineered organism can be altered
permanently, and that alteration can be passed on to the organism's
progeny.23 Hence, once released into the environment, a new microor-

ganism may reproduce and spread.24 Current concepts of environmental
clean-up may not be applicable, if they are based upon those we now use
for restoring the environment after a chemical spill. 2' A living, reproducing organism cannot so easily be recalled.26
Even though no genetically engineered microorganism has ever
caused an environmental or a human health problem,27 our ignorance
counsels caution. Not only do we have limited experience with genetic
engineering,28 but we have even less experience with environmental
release of genetically engineered microorganisms.29 Due to a combina-

22. See infra part IV.B.
23. See Clifford Grobstein, The Recombinant-DNA Debate, SCI. AM., July 1977, at 22.
The significance of the new developments in recombinant DNA is rooted in the central
biological role of DNA as the transmitter of genetic information between generations. The
transmission of the encoded genetic message depends on the ability of a cell to generate
exact replicas of the parental DNA and to allocate the replicas among the offspring.
Id.; BIRGE, supra note 21, at 36-37 (describing methods for making new DNA molecules and stating
that when the conjoined DNA is introduced into a cell in which it can replicate, it reproduces and
transmits itself to all of the daughter cells).
24. See COMMarrE ON ScIENTIFIC EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 96 (stating that if a
microorganism which has been released into the environment can persist beyond the intended period
of usefulness it may be necessary to utilize confinement to prevent the microorganism's spread
beyond the intended time or space).
25. See Hearings, supra note 11, at 7 (testimony of Dr. Martin Alexander that, unlike
chemicals, air pollutants, and radiation, microorganisms are able to increase in abundance thereby
creating an expanding base of pollution).
26. See, e.g., Alan Burdick, It's Not the Only Alien Invader, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1994 § 6
(Magazine), at 48 (describing the health and environmental problems associated with an invasion of
the brown tree snake into Guam and the Hawaiian Islands---the snake is not indigenous to either).
In recognition of this problem, the EPA proposes that no exemption be granted for release of small
quantities of genetically engineered microorganisms, but such an exemption is still available for
small quantities of chemicals. See Proposed Rules, supra note 4, at 45,532, 45,560 (may be codified
at 40 C.F.R. § 23.50).
27. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also infra part IV.A.
28. Genetic engineering has been used since only about 1973, when the first scientific report
on this technique was published. See Stanley N. Cohen et al., Construction ofBiologically Functional BacterialPlasmidsin Vitro, 70 PRoC. NAT'L. AcAD. SI. 3240 (1973); Stanley N. Cohen, The
Manipulation of Genes, SCI. AM., July 1975, at 24; Judith P. Swazey et al., Risks and Benefits,
Rights and Responsibilities:A History of the Recombinant DNA Research Controversy, 51 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1019, 1023 (1978).
29. See COMMrITrEE ON SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 87 (stating that "relatively
few field trials have been conducted with microorganisms modified by molecular methods");
Beringer & Bale, supra note 5, at 29 ("The only examples of intentional release of geneticallyengineered microorganisms (GEMs) into the environment have been recent and are few in number.").
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tion of our excellent safety record, our lack of experience, and the
unpredictable nature of living organisms, the risk of genetic engineering
may be described as a "low probability of high consequence risk."3
Il.

EARLY EFFORTS TO REGULATE GENETICALLY ENGINEERED
MICROORGANISMS

A. Initially Scientists Regulated Themselves
Shortly after the discovery of genetic engineering in 1973, a hot
debate arose within the scientific community as to whether genetically
engineered microorganisms were dangerous. 3' The potential hazards
appeared so real to some scientists that they voluntarily suspended
genetic engineering. For example, Paul Berg, whose research had
contributed to discovery of recombinant technology, suspended placement
of tumor virus deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") into a common bacterium
that often infects the human intestine. 32 In 1973, scientists who attended
the Gordon Conference on Nucleic Acids discussed the risks of genetic
engineering and then requested guidance from the National Academy of
Sciences.33 The committee formed by the National Academy for this
purpose called for an unprecedented moratorium on certain types of
genetic engineering in a July 1974 press conference. 34 This committee

30. HouSE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 10, at III (Letter of Transmittal by
Albert Gore, Jr.); see also id. at 13, 19-20; Fogleman, supra note 13, at 195-200 (describing some
of the risks of biotechnology); Gary Marchant, Modified Rulesfor Modified Bugs: BalancingSafety
and Efficiency in the Regulation of DeliberateRelease of GeneticallyEngineered Microorganisms,
1 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 163, 177-81 (1988) (providing differing views on the risks of deliberatelyreleased genetically-engineered microorganisms).
31. See Swazey et al., supra note 28, at 1021-22, 1048-51; see also Fogleman, supra note 13,
at 189-91.
32. Paul Berg and his graduate student, Janet Mertz, decided to defer placement of DNA from
an SV40 DNA tumor virus into a common human intestinal bacteria, Escherichia coli ("E. col"),
by using a lambda phage bacterial virus. The SV40 virus can transform cultured human cells so that
they acquire some tumor cell characteristics. A lambda phage can widely infect an E. coli population.
The fear was that such a recombinant bacteria might inadvertently escape containment, infect the
human population, and create an epidemic of intestinal or other types of cancers. See Swazey et al.,
supra note 28, at 1021-22.
33. See Maxine Singer & Dieter Soil, Guidelinesfor DNA HybridMolecules, 181 SCI. 1114,
1114 (1973); Paul Berg et al., PotentialBiohazards of RecombinantDNA Molecules, 185 Scd. 303,
303 (1974); Christine C. Vito, Note, State Biotechnology Oversight: The Juncture of Technology,
Law, and Public Policy, 45 ME. L. REV. 329, 332-33 (1993); Swazey et al., supranote 28, at 1023.
34. See Berg et al., supra note 33, at 303 ("[A]dherence to the major recommendations will
entail postponement or possibly abandonment of certain types of scientifically worthwhile experiments."); Swazey et al., supra note 28, at 1024-25 (stating that Berg, Baltimore, and Roblin held a
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also requested that the Director of the National Institutes of Health
("NIl") establish guidelines for handling recombinant DNA to minimize
whatever risks might exist. 5

The NIH responded in 1976 by publishing guidelines which, inter
alia, prohibited release of such microorganisms into the environment.36
The guidelines called for special laboratories to be constructed which
would keep the most hazardous of these organisms under physical
containment. 37 Scientists were urged to use a well-characterized strain
of Escherichia coli that does not usually colonize the normal bowel.38
Overall, the guidelines were stricter than the original moratorium.3 9
However, as scientists have become more familiar with genetically
engineered microorganisms, and no environmental or health problems
have been observed, 40 the NIH guidelines have been substantially

relaxed. 4' Thus, the scientific community has come to believe that the
risks of genetically engineered organisms were initially overestimated.42

press conference at the National Academy of Science headquarters on July 18, 1974 to explain why
they decided on a moratorium on recombinant DNA research). The types of experiments to be
avoided included: introduction of DNA into bacteria which would lead to antibiotic resistance or
bacterial toxin formation; and introduction of animal virus or cancer-causing genes into bacteria.
Scientists were also asked to carefully consider any plan to place animal DNA into a bacterial virus
or plasmid. See Berg et al., supra note 33, at 303.
35. Berg et al., supra note 33, at 303; Recombinant DNA Research Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg.
27,902, 27,902 (1976).
36. Recombinant DNA Research Guidelines, supra note 35, at 27,914-15 (stating that
deliberate release of recombinant organisms into the environment is prohibited).
37. Id. at 27,913-14 (describing P3 and P4 levels of containment which have special
engineering features and physical containment equipment).
38. Id. at 27,907.
39. Id. at 27,902.
40. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also infra part IV.A.
41. Vito, supra note 33, at 333-34 (describing how the NIH Guidelines were relaxed between
1976 and 1986). In 1978, the NIH eased restrictions so that most experiments could be conducted
at lower levels of containment. Recombinant DNA Research Revised Guidelines, 43 Fed. Reg.
60,080, 60,080 (1978) (stating that "[t]he final guidelines relax some of the restrictions under which
recombinant DNA research has been conducted since 1976"). Similarly, in 1980 and 1982 the
containment requirements were again relaxed. See, Recombinant DNA Research; Actions Under
Guidelines, 45 Fed. Reg. 6,718 (1980) (describing prohibited and exempt experiments, as well as
containment procedures for experiments covered by the NIH Guidelines); Recombinant DNA
Research; Actions Under Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 17,166, 17,166 (1982) ("Physical containment
requirements for some classes of experiments would be lowered").
42. See Hearings, supra note 11, at 2 (statement of Albert Gore, Jr., Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, that "we can all share the luxury of assuming that
those early concerns were overblown"); BIRGE, supra note 21, at 378 (stating the general tendency
has been for the NIH Guidelines to be relaxed as it becomes clearer that the potential hazards of
recombinant DNA have been overrated); Norman L. Rave, Jr., Note, Interagency Conflict and
Administrative Accountability: Regulating the Release of Recombinant Organisms, 77 GEo. L.J.
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B. Now Several FederalAgencies Regulate Recombinant
Microorganisms-But Without a Statutory Framework
Designedfor This Purpose
In 1984, an NIH-EPA conflict over the first deliberate release of a
genetically-engineered microorganism resulted in transfer of regulatory
power from the NIH to the EPA.43 This conflict gave rise to charges
that the NIH was inexperienced with environmental concerns, 44 was too
close to the scientists it was called upon to regulate, 45 and was politically naive for failing to create procedures and a record that would inspire
public confidence.46 However, while the EPA was experienced with
47
environmental matters, it had no experience with genetic engineering,
and it had no statutory framework explicitly designed for handling

1787, 1791 (1989) (stating that "the revision of the NIH Guidelines represented the consensus view
of the scientific community that the dangers of rDNA research had been exaggerated").
43. See Rave, supra note 42, at 1787; HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 10,
at 11-12; see also Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 587 F. Supp. 753 (D.D.C. 1984);
Colin Norman, Judge Halts Gene-Splicing Experiment, 224 Sci. 962, 962 (1984). A genetically
engineered Pseudomonas had been designed to protect potato plants from frost. While natural
Pseudomonas normally promote ice crystal formation in plants, researchers ascertained that deletion
of a portion of the Pseudomonas genome would prevent such ice crystal formation. See Colin
Norman, Legal Threat, Cold Delay UC Experiment, 222 Sci. 309, 309 (1983). In laboratory
experiments, where the ice-nucleation-deficient Pseudomonas was sprayed on plants, frost damage
did not occur until the temperature dropped to 23 *F. See id. Thus, these genetically engineered
microorganisms were no longer able to "nucleate" ice crystals. Id.
44. See HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supranote 10, at 44 (stating that the NIH has
considerable expertise in matters involving recombinant DNA, but no expertise in environmental
concerns); Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating
that "NIH has not yet displayed the rigorous attention to environmental concerns demanded by law"
and that "NIH should give greater consideration to the broad environmental issues attendant on
deliberate release of organisms containing recombinant DNA").
45. Heckler, 756 F.2d at 150 n.4 (stating that the NIH has potentially conflicting interests
because it serves "as a quasi-regulator of genetic research through the NIH Guidelines and as a
promoter of genetic research through its sizable funding of genetic research"); Rave, supra note 42,
at 1802 (stating that the NIH was perhaps the ultimate example of a "captured agency'").
46. See Rave, supra note 42, at 1808; see also Heckler, 587 F. Supp. at 766 (stating that the
current substantive and procedural standards of the NIH do not ensure full and adequate consideration of environmental issues); Heckler, 756 F.2d at 153 (finding only a single document on appeal
that recorded any NIH consideration of the environmental impact of genetically engineered
microorganism's dispersion and that this document recorded the minutes of a single meeting wherein
only a single statement was made that, while movement of the bacteria was possible, the numbers
of cells transported were small, and biological and physical processes limited survival).
47. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 10, at 44 (stating that the EPA has
experience in assessing environmental risks, but has never been involved in oversight of recombinant
DNA technology).
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recombinant microorganisms. 48 Thus, neither agency was ideally suited
to effectively regulate genetically engineered microorganisms.
As genetically engineered agricultural and pharmaceutical products
were created, the Department of Agriculture ("USDA") and the Food and

Drug Administration ("FDA") began to implement procedures for
handling these products through their own statutes.49 However, these
statutes were also not designed to address the unique problems of
genetically engineered microorganisms. °
In 1986, the Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology ("Framework") was created from existing agencies and statutes by the
White House Office of Science and Technology.51 This Framework
allocated most regulatory authority over genetically engineered products

48. See id. at 41 (stating that no statute gives any agency express jurisdiction over commercial
biotechnology). Therefore, the question of EPA jurisdiction over genetically engineered organisms
presents problems for oversight. Id. at 31. Under TSCA, the EPA can catalog and regulate chemical
substances. See Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2012 (1976) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-92 (1988 & Supp. 1993)). Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"), the EPA asserts control over microbes which can act as pesticides. 7
U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988 & Supp. 1993); see also Fogleman, supra note 13, at 205-64 (describing
federal regulation of biotechnology by several agencies under several statutes); Vandenbergh, supra
note 13, at 154149 (describing biotechnology regulation under FIFRA and TSCA).
49. The USDA asserts jurisdiction over genetically engineered plants under the Federal Plant
Pest Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 150aa to 150iji
(1988 & Supp. 1993), and the Plant Quarantine Act ("PQA"),
7 U.S.C. §§ 151-64, 166-67 (1988). See Final Policy Statement for Research and Regulation of
Biotechnology Processes and Products, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,336, 23,345 (1986). The FDA also claims
that food derived from genetically engineered plants falls within its jurisdiction under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95 (1988 & Supp. 1993). See Statement of Policy:
Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 22,984 (1992).
50. For example, the USDA has jurisdiction over "plant pests" under the Federal Plant Pest
Act, but it is unclear whether a genetically engineered plant may properly be defined as a "plant
pest." See 7 U.S.C. §§ 150aa(c) (1988); Fogleman, supra note 13, at 245; Vito, supra note 33, at
352. Similarly, the FDA has jurisdiction to regulate adulterated foods which, for example, may
contain a poisonous or deleterious substance. 21 U.S.C. § 342 (a)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1993). However,
while it may have jurisdiction to regulate food-related health risks of genetically engineered
microorganisms, the FDA probably cannot assert jurisdiction to regulate the environmental risks of
such microorganisms.
51. See Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed. Reg.
50,856, 50,856-57 (1984) (describing the formation of the Cabinet Council Working Group on Biotechnology through the Office of Science and Technology Policy to coordinate the government's
regulatory policy for biotechnology products); Coordinated Framework for Regulation of
Biotechnology; Establishment of the Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee, 50 Fed. Reg.
47,174, 47,174 (1985) (announcing the establishment of the Biotechnology Science Coordinating
Committee); Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 23,302
(1986) (announcing the policy of the federal agencies involved in review of biotechnology research
and stating that existing statutes provide a basic network of agency jurisdiction).
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to the EPA, FDA, and USDA under their existing statutes.5 2 However,
the Framework still relies upon a patchwork of statutes which do not

address the problems of living microorganisms because those statutes
were not originally designed for that purpose.53

III. THE EPA USED THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL
ACT TO PROPOSE NEW RULES FOR REGULATING
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED MICROORGANISMS

On September 1, 1994, the EPA published proposed rules for
regulating genetically engineered microorganisms' under TSCA.55
A.

General Purpose and Structure of TSCA

The TSCA authorizes the EPA to screen and catalog chemical
substances for unreasonable risk to health and the environment before
those substances are produced.5 6 In general, anyone who intends to
manufacture a new chemical substance must submit a notice to the EPA
of this intention. 7 The notice must describe the structure, proposed use,
production amount, byproducts, disposal methods, and all existing data
concerning the environmental and health effects of the chemical.5 The

52. See Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed. Reg.
at 50,858-77; Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 23,302;
Vito, supra note 33, at 335-41.
53. See Fogleman, supra note 13, at 205-64 (describing the history and the problems of NIH
and EPA biotechnology regulation); Vandenbergh, supra note 13, at 1549-63 (criticizing
biotechnology regulation under TSCA); Marchant, supra note 30, at 170, 182-88 (describing the
inadequacies of TSCA for regulating genetically engineered microorganisms); see also id.at 190
(stating that over a dozen bills to regulate recombinant DNA laboratory experiments were introduced
in Congress during the 1970's, but that Congress may now be content to defer to the regulatory
efforts of the Coordinated Framework).
54. Proposed Rules, supra note 4.
55. See id.
at 45,526-27; see generally Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90
Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-92 (1988 & Supp. 1993)).
56. See Toxic Substances Control Act §§ 5(a)-(f), 90 Stat. at 2012-18 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2604(a)-(f) (1988 & Supp. 1993)). As defined under TSCA, a "chemical substance" is any
"organic or inorganic substance of a particular molecular identity:' which includes "any combination
of such substances occurring in whole or in part as a result of a chemical reaction or occurring in
nature .... " Toxic Substances Control Act § 3(2)(A), 90 Stat. at 2004 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 2602(2)(A) (1988)).
57. See Toxic Substances Control Act § 5(a), 90 Stat. at 2012 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)
(1988 & Supp. 1993)).
58. See id. §§ 5(d), 8(a)(2), 90 Stat. at 2014, 2028 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2604(d),
2607(a)(2)).
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EPA must evaluate the information in the notice within ninety days 9
to determine whether the chemical constitutes an unreasonable risk to
health or to the environment, in which case the EPA may permanently'
or temporarily 6 limit production of the chemical. When the EPA has
insufficient information upon which to evaluate risk, the EPA can
promulgate rules which require testing of the chemical substance, if that
substance "may present" an unreasonable risk,62 or if "substantial
quantities" of the chemical substance are produced. 3
The TSCA is designed to regulate chemical substances." No

59. See id. § 5(a), 90 Stat. at 2012 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)).
60. Under § 5(f), the EPA may initiate rulemaking or issue a proposed order to limit
production of a chemical substance when there is a reasonable basis to believe that the substance
presents unreasonable risk to health or the environment. See Toxic Substances Control Act § 5(f),
90 Stat. at 2017 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2604(f)).
61. Under § 5(e), the EPA may temporarily suspend production to gather further information
for evaluating whether permanent limits on production are warranted. See Toxic Substances Control
Act § 5(e), 90 Star. at 2015 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2604(e)). However, even such temporary limits
on production require an EPA finding that the chemical substance may present an unreasonable risk.
Id; see also infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
62. Under TSCA § 4(a)(1)(A) the EPA may require testing of a chemical substance if it finds
that:
(i) the manufacture, distribution in commerce, processing, use, or disposal of a
chemical substance or mixture, or that any combination of such activities, may present
an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment,
(ii) there are insufficient data and experience upon which the effects of such
manufacture, distribution in commerce, processing, use, or disposal of such substance or
mixture or of any combination of such activities on health or the environment can
reasonably be determined or predicted, and
(iii) testing of such substance or mixture with respect to such effects is necessary
to develop such data.
15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(1)(A).
63. Under TSCA § 4(a)(1)(B) the EPA may require testing if it finds that:
(i) a chemical substance or mixture is or will be produced in substantial
quantities, and (1) it enters or may reasonably be anticipated to enter the environment in
substantial quantities or (II) there is or may be significant or substantial human exposure
to such substance or mixture,
(ii) there are insufficient data and experience upon which the effects of the
manufacture, distribution in commerce, processing, use, or disposal of such substance or
mixture or of any combination of such activities on health or the environment can
reasonably be determined or predicted, and
(iii) testing of such substance or mixture with respect to such effects is necessary
to develop such data.
15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(1)(B); see also infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
64. See Toxic Substances Control Act §§ 2, 3(2), 90 Stat. at 2003-04 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2601, 2602(2) (1988 & Supp. 1993)) (describing the findings, policy, and intent of Congress, as
well as setting forth the definition of a "chemical substance" under TSCA); see also S. REp. No. 94698, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-6 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4493-96 (discussing
the chemical industry, the effects of chemicals on our daily lives, and the need for regulation of

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol24/iss1/4

12

19951

Chadwick:REGULATING
Regulating MICROORGANISMS
Genetically Engineered Microorganisms Under the Toxic

indication exists that Congress intended to regulate recombinant
microorganisms under TSCA 5 When TSCA was enacted in 1976,
genetic engineering had only been in existence for about three years.6
Thus, it is unlikely that Congress gave any thought to genetically
engineered microorganisms when enacting TSCA, and the legislative
67
history of TSCA contains no mention of such microorganisms.
Instead, the legislative concern was for "chemical substances and
mixtures. 6 8
To assert its authority over recombinant microorganisms under
TSCA, the EPA has defined a microorganism as a chemical substance, 69
that is, as "a combination of substances of particular identities that occur
in nature or occur, in whole or in part, as a result of a chemical
reaction. 7 0 The accuracy of such a definition has been questioned.7'
B.

Burden of Proofand Scope of Judicial Review Under TSCA

A reasonable basis must exist for concluding that the substance is
or may present an unreasonable risk before the EPA can require
additional testing or limit production of a chemical substance.72 The

chemical substances, but not mentioning genetically engineering microorganisms).
65. HousE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 10, at 33 (stating that no indication
whatsoever exists that Congress intended TSCA to cover genetically engineered life forms).
66. See supra text accompanying note 31.
67. See HousE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 10, at 33. See generally, S. REP.
No. 94-698, supra note 64; H.R. REP. No. 94-1341, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
68. Toxic Substances Control Act § 2, 90 Stat. at 2003 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1988
& Supp. 1993)).
69. Proposed Rules, supra note 4, at 45,527.
70. Id; see also Toxic Substances Control Act § 3(2)(A), 90 Stat. at 2004 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 2602(2)(A) (1988)).
71. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 10, at 32 ("Whether the EPA can in
fact regulate biotechnology under TSCA remains to be seen, [because,] while TSCA provides EPA
the authority ...to regulate 'chemical substances' ... the act does not specifically address the
question of new genetically engineered organisms."); see also id.
at 33 ("[No indication whatsoever
exists that Congress intended TSCA to cover genetically engineered life forms.").
72. See Toxic Substances Control Act §§ 4(a), 6(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2603(a),

2605(a)).
Note that before testing can be ordered, TSCA requires an EPA finding that the
microorganism "may present" an unreasonable risk or that "substantial quantities" of the
microorganism will be released into the environment. See id. § 4(a), 90 Stat. at 2006 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 2603(a) (1988)); Dichloromethane Test Rule, supra note 8, at 30,300-04. However, in the
newly proposed rules, the EPA does not define or address what "substantial quantities" of a living
microorganism might be, and other amendments suggest that "unreasonable risk" alone becomes the
key determinant. See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
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EPA bears this burden of proving unreasonable risk. 3 However, a court
can set aside the EPA's finding of unreasonable risk if that finding is not
supported by substantial evidence in the rulemaking record taken as a
whole. 4 Substantial evidence is "something less than the weight of the
evidence." ' It is what "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate" to
support a conclusion.76 However, the mere possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence will not impair an EPA
finding under the substantial evidence standard." Instead, the standard
requires that the agency's finding be based upon the entire record, with
consideration for both detracting and supporting evidence.
For example, in 1980, the Environmental Defense Fund challenged
an EPA rule which exempted certain polychiorobiphenyl ("PCB")
containers,79 and all materials with less than fifty ppm of PCBs,80 from
regulation. The evidence supporting the PCB container rule consisted of
statements by only a few industry representatives that the disputed
containers did not leak."1 But the court of appeals observed that even
totally enclosed containers can develop leaks, and that the record had
failed to address the probability or magnitude of such leakage.82 The
to
court of appeals therefore found that this evidence was insufficient
83
support the classification of certain PCB uses as totally enclosed.
Similarly, the EPA made no finding that the fifty ppm cutoff would
involve no unreasonable risk to health or the environment, but chose the
cutoff because it wanted to exclude ambient sources from regulation and
because of the impact a lower cutoff would have on industry." Howev-

73. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1214 (5th Cir. 1991); Chemical Mfrs.
Ass'n. v. EPA, 859 F.2d 977, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1988); HousE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra
note 10, at 34.
74. Toxic Substances Control Act § 19(c)(l)(B)(i), 90 Stat. at 2040 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 2618(c)(1)(B)(i) (1988 & Supp. 1993)); Corrosion ProofFittings, 947 F.2d at 1213; Chemical
Mfrs. Ass'n., 859 F.2d at 991-92; Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 636 F.2d 1267, 1277-78

(D.C. Cir. 1980).
75. Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966); Corrosion Proof
Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1213.
76. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 522 (1981); Corrosion Proof
Fittings,947 F.2d at 1213.
77. Consolo, 383 U.S. at 620; Corrosion ProofFittings, 947 F.2d at 1213.
78. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., 452 U.S. at 522; CorrosionProofFittings, 947 F.2d at 1213.
79. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 636 F.2d 1267, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
80. Id. at 1269, 1279-80.
81. Id. at 1286.
82. Id. at 1285 & n.52.
83. Id. at 1286.

84. See id. at 1282.
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er, the record contained significant evidence that any exposure to PCBs
may have adverse effects,"5 and that PCBs were toxic to wildlife at
concentrations well below fifty ppm.86 The court of appeals found that
the EPA could not justify a fifty ppm cutoff simply because it was
technically feasible and not too burdensome to industry.8 7 Therefore,
this rule was set aside because the EPA had failed to produce substantial
evidence that the fifty ppm cutoff was within the zone of reasonable88
ness.
Thus, when only weak supporting data exists, contradictory
evidence can defeat the findings used to support rulemaking under the
statutory requirements of TSCA.
C. The Meaning of "UnreasonableRisk"
The original TSCA enactment does not provide a definition of
"unreasonable risk."89 However, the original enactment states that
Congress intends the EPA to be "reasonable and prudent" in its
administration of TSCA, and to consider the "environmental, economic,
and social impact" of any action taken under TSCA.9" Thus, Congress
intended that the EPA consider both the risks and the benefits in any
finding of unreasonable risk.9" TSCA was therefore not designed to

85. Id. at 1283-84.
86. Id. at 1283.

87. Id. at 1280-83.
88. Id. at 1284 n.47.
89. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 859 F.2d 977,984 (D.C. Cir. 1988); EnvironmentalDefense
Fund, Inc., 636 F.2d at 1276. However, § 6(c) of the original enactment lists considerations for
determining whether a chemical substance presents an unreasonable risk, which include:
(A) the effects of such substance or mixture on health and the magnitude of the
exposure of human beings to such substance or mixture,

(B) the effects of such substance or mixture on the environment and the
magnitude of the exposure of the environment to such substance or mixture,
(C) the benefits of such substance or mixture for various uses and the availability

of substitutes for such uses, and
(D) the reasonably ascertainable economic consequences of the rule, after

consideration of the effect on the national economy, small business, technological
innovation, the environment, and public health.

Toxic Substances Control Act § 6(c), Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2022 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 2605(c) (1988 & Supp. 1993)).
90. Toxic Substances Control Act § 2(c), Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2004 (codified at 15
U.C.S. § 2601(c) (1988 & Supp. 1993)); see also S. REP.No. 94-698, supra note 64, at 10.
91. S. REP. No. 94-698, supra note 64, at 13.
It is important to note that in the testing and key regulatory provisions of the

legislation, it is specifically required that the Administrator evaluate the risks and the
benefits of his actions before taking regulatory action. Thus, costs are not to be incurred
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eliminate all risk, but to identify and manage only "unreasonable"
risk.92
Upon finding that a chemical substance is an unreasonable risk, the
EPA may promulgate TSCA regulations under section 4 to require
testing, or under section 6 to limit the production of that substance.93
Greater evidence of risk is needed for limiting production under TSCA
section 6 than is required for requiring testing under TSCA section 4.94
Under TSCA section 6 the EPA must have a "reasonable basis" to
find that a chemical substance is an unreasonable risk and any
rulemaking based on that finding must utilize the "least burdensome
requirements.""5 For example, the Fifth Circuit found that an EPA ban
of asbestos brake products was not supported by substantial evidence of
unreasonable risk-even though asbestos was toxic and carcinogenic 96-because the EPA failed to consider the least burdensome regulatory
approach.97 Not only had the EPA failed to adequately study the
benefits of asbestos brakes relative to non-asbestos brakes, but it also
failed to consider the toxicity of non-asbestos products.9" In particular,

the EPA did not consider whether the number of highway fatalities might
increase because of an asbestos ban.99 The EPA had also failed to make
the appropriate comparisons between current workplaces, workplaces
with no asbestos, and improved workplaces which use current technology
to limit asbestos exposure.'" Accordingly, under TSCA section 6, the

unless they are offset by benefits of at least the same magnitude. In comparing risks,
costs, and benefits, however, it is important to recognize that one is weighing
noncommensurates, and it is not feasible to reach a decision just on the basis of
quantitative comparisons. The burdens of human suffering and premature death are
extraordinary and must be given full consideration in such decisions.
Id.
92. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1341, supra note 67, at 15 ("The Committee has limited the
Administrator to taking action only against unreasonable risks because to do otherwise assumes that
a risk-free society is attainable, an assumption that the Committee does not make.").
93. See Toxic Substance Control Act §§ 4(a), 6(a), 90 Stat. at 2006, 2020 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 2603, 2605 (1988 & Supp. 1993)).
94. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 859 F.2d 977, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (stating that "section
4's 'may present' language" demands even less than the more-probable-than-not finding of risk
required under section 6).
95. Toxic Substance Control Act § 6(a), 90 Stat. at 2020 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1988
& Supp. 1993)); see also Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1214-15, 1220 (5th Cir.
1991).
96. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1207.
97. Id. at 1229.
98. Id. at 1224-25.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1216.
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EPA must consider all of the benefits and burdens of a regulatory effort.
In contrast to the "reasonable basis" required under section 6, the
EPA need only find that the chemical "may present" an unreasonable risk
in order to require health or environmental testing under TSCA section
4(a)(l)(a).'0 Thus, the EPA need only find that "more than a theoretical basis" exists for concluding that a chemical substance presents a
sufficient risk to warrant testing.0 2 Both the toxicity of the chemical
substance and the amount of human exposure are considered in this
03
assessment of risk.
For example, under section 4 the EPA properly ordered further
testing of 2-ethylhexanoic acid ("EHA") even though EHA is totally
consumed during soap manufacture and is not a threat to consumers."
During its manufacture, only about 400 people were intermittently
exposed to E A!' s The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia upheld the EPA's finding of risk as "more than theoretical"
because insufficient information existed on the chronic health effects of
EHA, and EHA was structurally similar to known chemical carcinogens."o Thus, a risk to even a few industry workers can support an
EPA finding that additional testing is needed.
Moreover, under TSCA, the structure of a chemical may be
sufficiently predictive of that chemical's biological properties to establish
that a risk should be investigated through additional testing 7
However, if this "structural relationship test" were the sole basis for
assessing the risks of microorganisms, only organisms related to known
disease-causing organisms would be judged to be a potential threat under
the TSCA substantial evidence standard.'0 8 In this case, extensive

101.

90 Stat. at 2006 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(1)(A) (1988)).

102. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 859 F.2d 977, 990-91 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Ausimont
U.S.A. Inc. v. EPA, 838 F.2d 93, 96 (3d Cir. 1988). "However, the term 'may' as used in the phrase
'may cause or significantly contribute to' does not permit the Administrator to make a finding
respecting probability of a risk on the basis of mere conjecture or speculation .... H.R. REP. No.
94-1341,
103.
104.
105.
106.

supra note 67, at 18.
Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 859 F.2d at 990-91; Ausimont, 838 F.2d at 96.
See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 859 F.2d at 979-80.
2-Ethylhexanoic Acid; Final Test Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 40,318, 40,319 (1986).
Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 859 F.2d at 995-96.

107. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1341, supra note 67, at 17 (suggesting that Congress intended the
EPA to find that a new chemical substance may present an unreasonable risk on the basis of its
structural similarity to a chemical that is known to have adverse health or environmental effects).
108. See supra notes 3, 72-88.
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reporting requirements would not be justified. t°
IV.

THE PROPOSED RULES WILL NOT PROVIDE THE EPA WITH THE
NECESSARY INFORMATION TO FORM AN ADEQUATE

DECISION-MAKING RECORD

In view of the statutory standards of TSCA, the newly proposed
rules may fall short of their regulatory objectives because no evidence
currently exists that genetically engineered microorganisms are a greater
risk than non-engineered microorganisms. However, at this time, risk
cannot realistically be eliminated solely on the basis of a structural
relationship to a non-hazardous microorganism.
A.

New MicroorganismsProducedby Genetic Selection and by
Genetic EngineeringPose SimilarRisks

Microorganisms have been modified for centuries by "classical"
genetic selection procedures' for such beneficial purposes as making
cheese, bread, wine, olives, and sauerkraut, treating pollutants, and
recovering minerals."' Such classical procedures, however, largely
respect the biological barriers which prevent exchange of genetic material
between organisms of different species."' These classical procedures
are thought to occur in nature,"' whereas genetic engineering is
perceived as being "unnatural."". 4 It is a fear of the "unnatural," or of
the poorly understood limits on the power of genetic engineering, that

109. Under these circumstances the EPA might simply require reporting of the recipient species
and whether that species was genetically engineered to produce a toxic product. In view of the
EPA's Congressional mandate to consider the economic and social impact of any action taken under
TSCA, burdensome reporting requirements would not then be warranted. See supra text
accompanying note 90.
110. "Classical" methods of genetic modification include selection of desired traits following
spontaneous or induced mutation, or the natural exchange of DNA between related organisms. See
COMMITrEE ON ScIENTIFIc EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 12.
111. Seeid.at77-83.
112. See id. at 13 (stating that "[the genus barrier and, indeed, the kingdom barrier are no
longer obstacles" when the recent molecular techniques are employed); Grobstein, supra note 23,
at 24 (describing how there was no way to direct genetic change until recombinant DNA techniques
came along).
113. Id. at 12-13 (concluding, after describing mechanisms for classical modification of
microorganisms, that all those mechanisms presumably operate in nature).
114. See GOODFIELD, supra note 2, at 6 ("The notion that we can modify Nature at will brings
no satisfaction to those who contemplate the unholy mess-as they see it--that has resulted from
man's attempts to modify natural processes so far.").
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fuels concern.'
However, modem genetic techniques may be as safe, or even more
safe, than classical procedures, because the modem techniques are much
more precise and may therefore provide a more predictable outcome." 6
Moreover, no health or environmental problems have arisen during the
twenty years that microorganisms have been genetically engineered." 7
Hence, the risks associated with modification of microorganisms by
classical and genetic engineering procedures are now thought to be the
8

same."l
Even if a genetically-engineered microorganism with some harmful

property is released into the environment, that microorganism will have

to compete against indigenous microorganisms which have evolved and
adapted to survive in that environment." 9 Such indigenous microorgan-

isms usually prevent introduced microorganisms from becoming
established. 20 Unlike most species of plants and animals, all existing
microbial species are ubiquitously distributed world-wide, and all
available microbial niches are occupied at any one time.' 2 ' Hence, a
new microorganism may be no more competitive in one location than

another.'2
In natural environments, microbial strains arise and die out
continuously, because the environmental conditions and the content of

115. See id. at 9 (describing recombinant microorganisms as "Brave New Bugs," potentially
pathogenic, and as possible causes of great ecological damage, but concluding that no one really
knows); see also Fogleman, supra note 13, at 195-96 (describing how the public perceives
biotechnology as dangerous).
116. See COMMrrTEE ON SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 4, 97.
117. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
118. See COMMrr=E ON SCIENTIFIc EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 97 (stating that the key
concern is not whether microorganisms are modified by classical or modem molecular techniques,
but rather what phenotypic properties are conferred by those techniques); Fry & Day, supra note 10,
at 249 (stating that while recombinant bacterial genes will likely be transferred to other bacteria, it
seems almost impossible that man could construct functional nucleotide sequences in bacteria that
have not already been developed in nature, and that the chances that we could modify a bacterial
genome in a way that would be harmful to the environment is vanishingly small).
119. See COMMrrrEE ON SCIENTIFIc EVALUATION, supra note 2, at 102-03 (stating that the
"[e]nvironments into which microorganisms are to be introduced are diverse and often support a
complex indigenous microflora," so that competitive traits, such as a rapid utilization of abundant
substrates, high maximum specific growth rate, and antibiotic production, may be necessary if an
introduced microorganism is to colonize successfully in competition with native nicroorganisms).
120. Beringer & Bale, supra note 5, at 33; see Hearings, supra note 11, at 19.
121. See Fry & Day, supra note 10, at 248.
122. See id. at 248-49 (concluding that, while "genetically engineered rabbits might take over
Australia if they were to be released... genetically engineered bacteria will not take over Europe").
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microbial species are in continual flux." Bacterial populations respond
within hours to environmental pressures, 124 so that the types of
microbial strains occupying these niches vary with time. Thus, even if a
genetically engineered microorganism is introduced into the environment
and briefly survives, it will likely not survive for long.
Significant evidence therefore exists that genetically engineered
microorganisms present no more risk to health and the environment than
new microorganisms that are made or arise by classical genetic selection.
Thus, the EPA may not be able to gather substantial evidence from the
available record of safety to support a finding of unreasonable
currently
125
risk.
B.

But Our Knowledge of Genetically Engineered
MicroorganismsIs Imperfect

The problem lies with our limited experience with both genetic
engineering and the environmental release of genetically engineered
microorganisms. 126 Only a few genetically engineered microorganisms
have been observed in the environment. 27 Moreover, the bacterial
species which were released were either modified so that a genetic
function was lost--something that frequently happens naturally--or were
well-characterized and understood before modification.128 Microbial
geneticists know so little about the biochemical determinants of
competitiveness that they are unable to utilize modem genetic techniques
to produce more competitive microorganisms.' 29 Very little is also
known about the exchange of genetic information among closely or

123. See id. at 248.
124. Id.
125. Again, the exception to this statement is genetic engineering of a microorganism which is
known to be harmful, e.g., because it can cause disease. The EPA might justifiably presume that this
microorganism remains an unreasonable risk until proven otherwise. See supra note 3; see also supra
note 109 and accompanying text.
126. We have only about 22 years of experience with genetically engineered nicroorganisms
because techniques enabling genetic engineering were only developed in 1973. See supra text
accompanying note 31.
127. See COMMrrTEE ON SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 87-89; Beringer & Bale,
supra note 5, at 29.
128. See COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 5, 87-89; Beringer & Bale,
supra note 5, at 33-38; D.F. Dwyer et al., Fate and Behaviour in an Activated Sludge Microcosm
of a Genetically-EngineeredMicro-organismDesignedto DegradeSubstitutedAromatic Compounds,
in THE RELEASE OF GENETICALLY-ENGINEERED MICRO-OROANISMS, supra note 5, at 77, 85-86.

129. Beringer & Bale, supra note 5, at 34.
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distantly related microorganisms under natural conditions. 30 As stated
by Sidney Brenner, "One of the biggest biohazards is our lack of knowl13
edge."'
Successful colonization of an environment is determined by a
dynamic interplay between the physical-chemical composition of the
environment, the multitudinous living species in it, and the abilities of
the genetically engineered microorganism. 132 But these factors are
difficult to evaluate and describe.133 For example, the living composition of an environment is not fixed-it is an emergent phenomenon,
which can only be described at a single point of time.'34
Moreover, while information on the genetic structure of a new
microorganism may be available, the success of any microorganism in an
ecosystem cannot be predicted solely on that basis. 135 Even the simplest
microorganisms are composed of almost 1000 molecules; most cells have
at least 2000 distinct and complex macromolecules. 3 6 Hence, the number
and complexity of these molecules alone make even the simplest cells
extraordinarily complex from a chemical viewpoint. 3 7 Moreover, we
do not understand the structure of many of these molecules. Hence,
accurate prediction of organismic function from knowledge of some of
the structures of these molecules is unrealistic.
Similarly, risk identification based only on the properties of the

130. See COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIc EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 101.
131. GOODFIELD, supra note 2, at 99.
132. Beringer & Bale, supranote 5, at 36-37 (listing many factors that may influence Rhizobium
survival in soil); COMMITrEE ON SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 103 (stating that "no
basis other than field tests exists for judging field competition and no clear information is available
on what governs competitive ability among the rhizobia," thus selection of appropriate strains is done
empirically).
133. See Hearings,supra note 11, at 20 (statement of Dr. Frances E. Sharples of the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory that there is no systematic way to understand which of a multiplicity of factors
contributes to the success or failure of an introduced organism in a new environment); HOUSE
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 10, at HI ("Predicting the specific type, magnitude or
probability of environmental effects associated with deliberate release will be extremely difficult at
the present time.").
134. See Fry & Day, supra note 10, at 248 ("The species complement of natural habitats
is... very plastic. That is species grow and die rapidly as conditions change ....").
135. See COMMITEE ON SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION, supranote 3, at 93 (stating that even though
molecular genetic techniques allow precise genetic manipulation, such manipulation may still
produce unintended genetic changes owing to the pleiotropic nature of gene action).
136. See WATSON ET AL., A SHORT COURSE, supra note 2, at 2. Note that macromolecules are
polymeric molecules that are hundreds to thousands times larger than small molecules like sugars,
amino acids, and fats. See id.
137. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1995

21

HOFSTRA
LAW REVIEW
Hofstra
Law Review,
Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1995], Art.[Vol.
4 24:223

parental strain is likely to be underinclusive1 38 The addition or loss of
genetic material in a benign species might make that species
harmful. 39 Genetic engineering can make new organisms that have
never existed in nature,"4 and can do so very quickly.' 4 ' Foreign
genetic material which is harmless in one species might be transferred to
42
another species in the environment to create a harmful organism.
One common method for obtaining a new microorganism with a desired
trait is to "shotgun" randomized pieces of the entire DNA of another
organism into bacteria and then later select the bacteria with the desired
trait. 43 Hence, microorganisms are frequently created whose genetic

make-up is completely unknown, and the purported precision and
predictability of genetic engineering is not realized.'" The benign
nature of a parent cannot always be attributed to its progeny.
138. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
139. See Hearings, supra note 11, at 7-8 (testimony of Dr. Martin Alexander that, contrary to
statements by others, even slight changes arising from genetic engineering may alter the harmfulness
of organisms); COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 108 (stating that mutations
which eliminate an avirulence gene product may increase the pathogenic potential of an organism).
140. See HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 10, at 5 ("[B]iotechnology is now
producing countless genetically engineered organisms with genotypes that did not previously exist
[so] the potential for ecological disruption may be greater for these 'nonnatural' organisms than for
any natural entity."); BIRGE, supra note 21, at 377 (stating that any DNA can be conjoined to any
other DNA, regardless of species barriers or any other genetic impediments).
141. See COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 7 (stating that "[r]ecent
advances in biology have proceeded at an astonishing rate, and biologists now have the means, by
directly modifying genes, to alter living organisms more quickly and more precisely than has been
done by nature and humans over millennia").
142. Birge, supra note 21, at 378; HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 10, at 19
(describing two normally nonpathogenic microorganisms which were combined and, surprisingly,
yielded one pathogenic isolate and another isolate that killed tree seedlings); John C. Fry & Martin
J. Day, Plasmid Transfer in the Epilithon, in BACTERIAL GENETICS IN NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS,
supra note 5, at 55, 77 (stating that plasmids have been commonly found in bacteria from a variety
of natural habitats and that Gram negative genera of bacteria are potential recipients for at least some
of these naturally occurring plasmids, and concluding that conjugal plasmid transfer occurs at a
relatively high rate).
143. See BIRGE, supra note 21, at 376 (stating that when "the map position of the appropriate
DNA sequence is not known, a common solution is to produce a library of DNA clones" which is
prepared by taking the entire genome of the organism and breaking it up into more or less standardsized pieces); WATSON ET AL., supra note 2, at 236-37 (describing how interferon DNA was first
cloned by identifying its approximate size and then creating a library of all human white cell cDNAs
of that size).
144. See COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 87 (describing how
microorganisms which are transformed with the total DNA from a donor can contain additional DNA
which can also contribute to the recipient's phenotype). Note, however, that genetically engineered
"libraries" created by these procedures are made during research and development. Only the desired
microorganism will be used extensively. Thus, the uncharacterized microorganisms will probably not
be deliberately released into the environment.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol24/iss1/4

22

19951

REGULATING
Chadwick:
RegulatingMICROORGANISMS
Genetically Engineered Microorganisms Under the Toxic

Thus, we should not rely only upon a description of a
microorganism's structure and parentage to assess risk. Instead, a more
perfect determinant of risk should be identified.

C. The Newly ProposedRules Must, but Do Not, Define "Unreasonable Risk"for Genetically Engineered Microorganisms
The proposed rules for regulating genetically engineered microorganisms were promulgated under TSCA section 5,145 which requires
that the EPA be notified of an intention to manufacture or process any
new chemical substance. 146 The EPA cannot require testing under
TSCA section 5;"' it can only require reporting of whatever information
the genetic engineer has already generated. Promulgation under section
5 therefore suggests that the EPA presumes the necessary information
already exists for risk assessment of genetically engineered microorgant4
isms. 1

However, genetic engineers are rarely trained in microbial ecology149 Very little is known about genetic transfer in nature and about
the survival, persistence, and competitiveness of bacteria in most environments. 5 ' Therefore, even though a genetic engineer may be conversant
on basic microbiology, that engineer cannot readily derive what
information is needed to assess environmental risk, even if he or she
145. Proposed Rules, supra note 4, at 45,526; see Toxic Substances Control Act, § 5, 90 Stat.
at 2012-20 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (1988 & Supp. 1993)).
146. Toxic Substances Control Act § 5, 90 Stat. at 2012 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (1988
& Supp. 1993)).
147. Testing can only be required if the EPA makes a finding either under § 4(a)(1)(A) that the
chemical substance "may present" an unreasonable risk or under §4(a)(1)(B) that the chemical
substance is present in "substantial quantities." See Toxic Substances Control Act § 4(a), 90 Stat.
at 2006 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (1988 & 1993)); Dichloromethane Test Rule, supra note
8, at 30,300-04 (providing a description ofthe findings that the EPA must make before it can require
testing under TSCA section 4, 15 U.S.C. § 2603). But see infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text
(arguing that unreasonable risk of, not release of or exposure to, substantial quantities of genetically
engineered microorganisms controls the extent to which the EPA can regulate these microorganisms).
148. Cf. Proposed Rules, supra note 4, at 45,526.
EPA will screen new microorganisms before they are manufactured for general
commercial use, or in some circumstances used for commercial research and development
(R&D) purposes, until sufficient familiarity is gained with their behavior. As EPA
acquires familiarity with new microorganisms through reviews or other avenues, EPA
expects certain of these organisms to be come eligible for reduced reporting ....
Id. Thus, the EPA admits it is unfamiliar with the behavior of new microorganisms but expects to
become familiar with them through the review process.
149. See Fry & Day, supra note 5, at vii (noting that few researchers have crossed the divide
between bacterial genetics and bacterial ecology).
150. See id: see also notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
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were so motivated. 5 '
The reporting requirements specified by the proposed rules are
particularly important because, under TSCA, the EPA cannot require
generation of new information by testing unless it first makes a finding
that the microorganism will be released in "substantial quantities" or that
it may present an "unreasonable risk."' 52 The EPA provides no definition or mention of "substantial quantities" in the proposed rules,' and
has thus not addressed what quantity of a living, reproducing microorganism is substantial enough to be a risk. However, while the EPA will
exempt release of small quantities of chemicals from regulation under
TSCA, no such exemption is available for genetically engineered
microorganisms under the proposed rules." 4 Elimination of this
exemption indicates that the EPA will prohibit release of any amount of
a genetically engineered microorganism, when that microorganism poses
an unreasonable risk. "Unreasonable risk" therefore becomes the critical
determinant.
Unless the EPA defines what information it needs to assess risk, the
EPA may not be able to gather the necessary information to regulate
genetically engineered microorganisms. Moreover, lack of definition may
channel the EPA and the genetic engineer into a series of unproductive
55
interactions where no exchange of relevant information occurs.

151. See Marchant, supra note 30, at 183-85 (descnbing how biotechnology companies and
academic researchers may not be motivated to extensively report to the EPA under TSCA).
152. See Toxic Substances Control Act § 4(a), 90 Stat. at 2006 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)
(1988)); Dichloromethane Test Rule, supra note 8, at 30,300-04 (providing a description of the
findings that the EPA must make before it can require testing under TSCA section 4, 15 U.S.C. §
2603); see also notes 62-63.
153. See generally Proposed Rules, supra note 4; see also ad at 45,561-63 (may be codified at
40 C.F.R. § 725.3) (providing definitions).
154. See id. at 45,532, 45,560 (may be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 723.50); see also Statement of
Policy; Microbial Products Subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act and
the Toxic Substances Control Act, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,313, 23,330 (1986).
155. The EPA has only 90 days in which to assess whether the applicant can begin using the
microorganism. See Proposed Rules, supranote 4, at 45,566 (may be codified at 40 C.F.R § 725.50);
see also Marchant, supra note 30, at 180 ("[R]egulators face a "Catch-22" dilemma. They want to
approve only those deliberate release field tests that are safe, but in many cases they will need the
results of field tests to determine that a particular microorganism is in fact safe."); Letter from
Charles C. Hancock, Executive Officer, American Society for Biochemistry and Molecular Biology,
to the Environmental Protection Agency 1 (May 16, 1989) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review)
(suggesting that much of the proposed regulation is unnecessary and advocating that the EPA
regulate under shorter, streamlined procedures like the TSCA Environmental Release Application).
However, this review period may be extended for "good cause." Id. at 45,567 (may be codified at
40 C.F.R § 725.56). "Good cause" includes the need for additional information. Id. Therefore, if the
EPA is not satisfied with the information provided by a genetic engineer, it can require submission
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However, the new regulations do not define discrete parameters
which might accurately illuminate risk. Each person who intends to
manufacture or process a genetically engineered microorganism will be
required to submit a Microbial Commercial Activity Notice ("MCAN"),
unless an exemption is available. 56 The MCAN must provide all
information "known to or reasonably ascertainable" by that person which
would permit the EPA to "make a reasoned evaluation" of the effects of
the new microorganism upon human health and the environment. 57
Such broad language suggests that the EPA and the genetic engineer
know what type of information is needed to assess risk. However, while
the newly proposed rules list factors to be reported, such factors are not
necessarily determinants of risk.'5 8
For example, the newly proposed rules require a taxonomic
description of the new microorganism, the microorganism which was
genetically engineered (the "recipient"), and the microorganism which
contributed the DNA for the genetic engineering (the "donor"). 15 9 The
rules require a "detailed description of the genetic construction" of the
new microorganism." 6 The rules also require description of the habitat,
16
'
geographical distribution, and source of the recipient microorganism.
A genetic engineer may frequently be able to provide this information. 62 However, such information will only provide the microbial
source and structure, which may shed some light on risk, but, without
further information, cannot accurately predict risk. 6 3

of additional information.
156. See Proposed Rules, supra note 4, at 45,571 (may be codified at 40 C.F.R § 725.105(a)).
157. Id. at 45,572 (may be codified at 40 C.F.R § 725.155(a)).

158. These factors may, however, have some other utility, such as for cataloging the new
microorganism or for determining whether information on that microorganism has already been
reported.
159.
(d)(2)).
160.
161.
162.

See Proposed Rules, supranote 4, at 45,572 (maybe codified at 40 C.F.R § 725.155(d)(1)Id. (may be codified at 40 C.F.R § 725.155(d)(2)(iii)).
Id. (may be codified at 40 C.F.R § 725.155(d)(3)).
See COMMrEE ON SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 93 (stating that the new

molecular methods permit a degree of genetic characterization unobtainable by classical genetic
exchange and recombination processes and that precise alterations can be made and verified by these

methods).
163. See supra notes 135-44 and accompanying text. The proposed rules also require a
description of the manufacturing byproducts, the uses of the new microorganism, the total production
volume, the worker exposure, and any plans for environmental release. See Proposed Rules, supra
note 4, at 45,572-73 (may be codified at 40 C.F.R § 725.155(e)-(h)). This information may also be
available, particularly when the microorganism was created and will be used for industrial purposes.
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Any existing test data on the new microorganism must also be
submitted, for example, data on the health and environmental effects,
physical and chemical properties, human exposure, environmental release,
and any published studies on the new microorganism." 6 However,
under TSCA, the EPA cannot compel testing to produce these data,
unless it first makes a finding that the microorganism may present an
unreasonable risk,'65 and a genetic engineer will often not possess this

information. t66

The newly proposed rules may most closely approach risk definition
in a subsection entitled "Phenotypic and ecological characteristics,"'67
which addresses not what the new microorganism is, but what it does in
the environment. This subsection requires a description of the "survival
capability," the "probable dissemination patterns," and the "biological
interactions" of the new microorganisms under "relevant environmental
conditions."'" However, this directive will also likely fall short of its
mandate to identify unreasonable risk.
First, survival per se is not the key determinate of environmental

competitiveness. Microorganisms can survive for extended periods of
time in a dormant state but have no impact on the environment because
they are not competing with other organisms. 69
Instead, reproductive fecundity may be a more important determi-

nate of risk. 70 Without the ability to reproduce, the microorganism

cannot compete with other microorganisms,' 7' cannot effectively infect

164.
165.
166.
167.

See Proposed Rules, supra note 4, at 45,573 (may be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 725.160).
See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
See Proposed Rules, supra note 4, at 45,572 (may be codified at 40 C.F.R.

§ 725.155(d)(3)).

168. See id.
169. See J.R. Saunders et al., Genetic Approaches to the Study of Gene Transfer in Microbial
Communities, in BACTERIAL GENETICS IN NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS, supra note 5, at 3, 4-5 ("I]f
a healthy population of some bacterial species enters starvation conditions, they... become nonculturable [and dormant] over a period of time.").
170. See WATSON ET AL., supranote 3, at 99 (stating that cell number and size do not tell us
whether a cell is dead or alive but that we can deternine this by seeing whether or not it forms
daughter cells); COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 100 (stating that "[a]n
organism that is killed or does not persist might be viewed as similar to a chemical treatment that
produces no chemical residues"). The EPA, in recognition of a microorganism's reproductive ability,
has eliminated an exemption which allowed environmental release of "small quantities" of traditional
chemical substances. See Proposed Rules, supra note 4, at 45,532, 45,560 (may be codified at 40
C.F.R. § 723.50); 15 U.S.C. § 2604(h)(3).
171. See Fry & Day, supranote 10, at 243 ("Any bacterium that enters the natural environment
and becomes established in a habitat must be able to survive and grow in competition with the
natural microflora"); COMMITrEE ON SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 102-03 ("[H]igh
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a host organism, 72 and cannot successfully invade new habitats.'7 3
Similarly, the microorganism which emerges from a dormant state will
only be a threat if it reproduces. 74 Thus, reproductive capacity may be
a better indicator of risk than survival capacity.'75
Second, the EPA provides no definition of "survival capability"

"probable dissemination patterns," or "biological interactions," nor any
176

yardstick or control against which to measure these parameters.
Thus, even if the EPA defines "survival capability" to mean reproductive
capability, this capability is only meaningful if compared with something
known or similarly situated, for example, the parental strain from which
the genetically engineered microorganism was derived. 17 1 Without a
requirement that such178a comparison be made, "survival capability," is not
an indicator of risk.

maximum specific growth rate, [as well as] antibiotic production, may be necessary if an introduced
microorganism is to colonize successfully in competition with native microorganisms.").
172. See COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIc EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 109 (stating that
reproductive structures must be formed that allow the microorganism to reach new hosts); see also
id. at 105 (stating that a biocontrol agent used to combat a pathogen will have to out-compete the
pathogen).
173. See S. Kjellberg et al., Round Table 3: Survival, Persistence and Colonization, in THE
RELEASE OF GENETICALLY-ENGINEERED MICRO-ORGANISMs, supra note 5, at 231, 236-37
(discussing, in the context of whether new microorganisms will colonize unintended ecological
niches, how scientists consider placing suicide genes into bacteria destined for release or into those
bacteria which might escape from a closed system niche).
174. The fear with regard to dormant microorganisms may be that they survive long enough to
be dispersed into new environments where they will flourish. Hence, the genetically engineered
microorganism's reproductive capacity might be examined in several generic environments, for
example, soil, fresh water, salt water, and the like. See COMMITfEE ON SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION,
supra note 3, at 117 ("It is widely accepted that aquatic and terrestrial laboratory microcosms are
useful for examining the fate and effects of introduced microorganisms as well as their survival and
persistence in specific environments.").
175. Note also that the probability of an organism's ability to grow and survive could be easily
estimated, probably without great cost. HousE SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 10, at 23.
176. See Proposed Rules, supra note 4, at 45,561-62 (may be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 725.3)
(providing definitions of terms used in the proposed rules); id. at 45,572-73 (may be codified at 40
C.F.R. § 725.155).
177. See COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 111 ("Key phenotypic
properties [for assessing risk] include the fitness of a genetically modified microorganism relative
to its unmodified counterpart ....
.'); D.J. Drahos et al., Pre-Release Testing Procedures:US Field
Test of a lacZY-Engineered Soil Bacterium, in THE RELEASE OF GENETICALLY-ENGIEERED MICORORGANISMS, supra note 5, at 181, 187 (providing results from the first TSCA-approved test of a
deliberately released microorganism, and using some comparisons of the properties of the genetically
engineered strain with those of its parental strain to generate those results).
178. Moreover, if "survival capacity" is intended to embrace both the reproductive capability
and the dormancy problems of a microorganism, these are really separate factors which are better
analyzed separately. See, e.g., J.R. Saunders et al., supra note 169, at 4-5 (analyzing the survival and
the non-culturability of microorganisms separately). Cf supra note 174.
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The EPA should focus on concrete comparisons between the new
microorganism and its naturally occurring parental strain, instead of
focusing on nebulous concepts of "survival capability," "probable
dissemination patterns," and "biological interactions" of the new
microorganisms. Comparisons between a new microorganism and its
nearest relative are relevant because the two strains differ only minutely
from each other, for example, by about one gene in 2000.179 Such
similar strains should behave the same when released in the environment,
unless the genetic engineering has modified the ecological properties of
the new microorganism. 8 The properties of the new microorganism
thus can be best understood by comparison with its parental strain.
However, the proposed rules do not require such comparisons
because testing cannot be required under TSCA section 5, unless the
EPA first makes a finding of unreasonable risk.' The EPA will not
gather substantial evidence to support such a finding from reports
submitted in response to the proposed rules because those rules merely
seek information on what the microorganism is and not what it does in
the environment.8 2
V.

CONCLUSION

TSCA section 5 requires substantial evidence on the record of
unreasonable risk before the EPA can do anything other than gather
existing information. 3 However, genetic engineers generally have not
been trained to assess environmental or health risks.'84 Moreover, no
evidence exists that genetically engineered microorganisms have ever
caused health or environmental harm.' 85 Thus, under TSCA section 5
the EPA may not obtain relevant information of environmental risk and
hence may not effectively regulate genetically engineered microorganisms. TSCA may therefore not be the best vehicle for managing
whatever risks genetically engineered microorganisms do pose.
The EPA needs to clearly define what constitutes risk in the context

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Beringer & Bale, supra note 5, at 29.
Id.
See supra notes 62-63, 89-109, 145-54 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 74-88, 152-78 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 10, 116-25 and accompanying text.
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of genetic engineering," 8 and find the statutory authority to gather data
on genetically engineered microorganisms which address that risk.
Authority does exists under TSCA section 10 to conduct such research
as is necessary to carry out the purposes of TSCA. 18 7 Section 10 not
only grants this authority to the EPA but mandates that the EPA shall
develop screening and monitoring techniques for detecting toxic chemical
substances and shall develop the fundamental scientific basis of such
techniques.'8 8 Therefore, the EPA at least has the authority to ascertain
what parameters define health and environmental risks for genetically
engineered microorganisms and to determine how to test for these risks.
This is a crucial step toward designing any regulatory effort.
Second, the EPA should consider whether testing is necessary to
assess the risks of each new microorganism. If information relating to the
newly defined risk parameters can only be obtained through testing,
TSCA may not give the EPA sufficient authority to require such testing
and Congressional action may be needed.
Absent a more focused approach, the EPA may not be able to
identify microorganisms which pose an unreasonable risk to health and
the environment under the Toxic Substances Control Act.
Robin A. Chadwick*

186. See BIRGE, supra note 21, at 380 (stating that while the EPA "is attempting to define
suitable precautions for" deliberate release of genetically engineered organisms, "[p]art of the
problem is that the appropriate ecologic studies that might shed light on the persistence of genetically
engineered organisms in the environment are only now beginning"); COMMITtEE ON SCIENTIFIC
EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 87 ("[O]nly a relatively few field trials have been conducted with

microorganisms modified by molecular methods.").
187. Toxic Substances Control Act § 10(a), Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Star. 2012, 2031-32 (1976)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2609(a) (1988)).
188. See Toxic Substances Control Act §§ 10(a)-(e), 90 Stat. at 2031-32 (1976) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2609(a) (1988)).
* Ph.D. Yale University, 1989. I wish to thank Professor Vern R. Walker for his insightful
commentary and guidance. I am also grateful to the personnel of Kenyon & Kenyon for their support
and understanding. Finally, I thank my boys, Danny and David, for their patience.
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